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I. INTRODUCTION
The relationship between domestic violence and firearms is an incredibly
dangerous one, as a simple argument can escalate and result in the death of
an individual.' In 1996, Congress added the Lautenberg Amendment to the
Gun Control Act of 1968 in an attempt to prevent these types of violent
incidents by prohibiting perpetrators of domestic violence from possessing
a firearm.2 However, in 2007, the Fourth Circuit decided United States v.
Hayes, where it completely disregarded basic rules of statutory
interpretation and Congress' stated legislative purpose.3 This decision
caused a circuit split between the Fourth Circuit and the nine other circuits
that had previously decided the question of whether the Lautenberg
Amendment requires a domestic relationship as a statutory element.4
The Supreme Court overturned the Fourth Circuit's decision in 2009
after interpreting the plain language of the statute and considering
congressional intent.5 Dissenting, Justice Roberts, joined by Justice Scalia,
argued that the majority incorrectly utilized legislative history and laid a
1. See 142 CONG. REC. S11876 (daily ed. Sept. 30, 1996) (statement of Sen.
Lautenberg) (providing a hypothetical scenario of how the presence of a firearm in a
domestic violence dispute can result in death or serious injury, particularly when a
history of domestic violence exists).
2. See id at S 11878 (statement of Sen. Lautenberg) (arguing that the provision
should not be interpreted to allow law enforcement agencies to ignore violent
misdemeanor convictions when determining whether a person is barred from
possessing a firearm).
3. See 482 F.3d 749, 752 (4th Cir. 2007) (holding that a "domestic relationship"
must be a statutorily designated element of the underlying offense for the offense to
qualify as a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence that would prohibit an individual
from possessing a firearm).
4. See United States v. Hayes, 129 S. Ct. 1079, 1083-84 (2009) (acknowledging
the Court granted certiorari to resolve the conflict between the Fourth Circuit and the
majority of other circuits, including the First and D.C. Circuits).
5. See id. at 1089 (holding that a domestic relationship is not required as a
specified element of the predicate offense).
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foundation for an impractical and unfair application of the law.6 The
dissent's approach hinders the purpose of the Amendment, giving guns a
place in an abusive domestic relationship.
7
This note argues that the Supreme Court was justified in its use of
legislative history to interpret the Lautenberg Amendment, and that the
dissent is incorrect in placing less importance on the legislative record.
Part II examines the Lautenberg Amendment, some basic rules of statutory
interpretation, and how different circuits and the Supreme Court have
approached the interpretation and application of the Amendment. 8 Part III
posits that the Fourth Circuit was incorrect in its holding and argues the
Supreme Court is justified in its opinion.9 Part IV discusses the policy
implications of the Fourth Circuit's holding, which would have rendered
the Amendment meaningless and significantly increased the danger in an
abusive domestic relationship.10 Finally, Part V concludes that legislative
history and prior court decisions, even non-binding decisions, should play
an important role in statutory interpretation, particularly when ambiguity
exists in a federal statute that has nationwide impact.1"
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Gun Control Act of 1968
Congress passed the Gun Control Act ("the Act") in 1968, outlining
various restrictions on who could legally possess firearms.' 2  At the
beginning of the Act, Congress explicitly states that the Act's purpose is to
promote safety. 13 The first part of the Act provides definitions for terms
used throughout, including the term misdemeanor crime of domestic
6. See id. at 1089-93 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (emphasizing that rules of
statutory construction, such as the Rule of Last Antecedent and the rule of lenity,
compel the majority to find a domestic relationship as a required element).
7. See id. at 1092 (arguing that the majority was misguided by legislative intent,
which will cause juries and judges to perform factfinding missions).
8. See infra Part 1I (discussing two landmark cases from the First and D.C.
Circuits decided prior to the Fourth Circuit's decision, as well as Justice Roberts'
dissent in Hayes).
9. See infra Part III (arguing that the Supreme Court correctly utilized rules of
statutory construction and legislative history due to the nature of the Amendment).
10. See infra Part IV (explaining the implications of refusing to consider legislative
history in cases of statutory ambiguity).
11. See infra Part V (recommending that courts look to legislative history even
when they do not find glaring statutory ambiguities).
12. See generally 18 U.S.C. § 921 (2006).
13. See Gun Control Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-618, § 101, 82 Stat. 1213, 1213
(1968) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.) (stating that the
purpose of the title is to assist law enforcement officials in fighting crime and
violence).
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violence ("MCDV") that this note discusses.' 4
B. The 1996 Lautenberg Amendment
In 1996, Congress added the Lautenberg Amendment to the Act. The
Amendment made it unlawful for a person convicted of a MCDV, in any
court of the United States, to possess a firearm.' 5 The Amendment also
specifically defines what constitutes a MCDV. 16
Senator Frank Lautenberg (D-NJ), the chief sponsor of the Amendment,
emphasized in his floor statements that the purpose of the bill was to close
certain loopholes in the Act, specifically focusing on the dangers of
firearms in a domestic violence dispute.' 7 Senator Lautenberg also noted
that special provisions were added to protect the due process rights of these
misdemeanants." s Federal and state courts have generally interpreted the
language of the Amendment broadly to effectuate the stated purpose
Senator Lautenberg outlined in his floor statements.'9
1. Legal Elements of a Misdemeanor Crime of Domestic Violence
The definition contained in the Act enumerates two elements that
compose a MCDV. 20 The first element requires that the underlying act
must be an offense that is a misdemeanor under federal, state, or tribal
law. 2 The second element states the offense must have, as one of its own
elements, the use or the threatened use of physical force committed against
22an individual with whom the person is in a domestic relationship.
14. § 921(33)(A).
15. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (2006) (making it unlawful for certain persons "to ship
or transport in interstate commerce, or possess in or affecting commerce, any firearm or
ammunition; or to receive any firearm or ammunition which has been shipped or
transported in interstate or foreign commerce"); § 922(g)(9) (delineating that one of the
many categories of prohibited persons is anyone who has been convicted of a MCDV).
16. See § 921(a)(33)(A) (defining a MCDV as an offense which is considered a
misdemeanor under federal or state law and has the element of the use or attempted use
of physical force or threatened use of a deadly weapon, committed against an
individual with whom the offender maintains a domestic relationship).
17. See 142 CONG. REC. S11877 (daily ed. Sept. 30, 1996) (statement of Sen.
Lautenberg) (stating that the provision prevents domestic violence offenders from
falling into a loophole since they would not be considered convicted felons and might
otherwise be allowed to possess a firearm that may contribute to a deadly situation in a
domestic violence dispute).
18. See id. (showing that there are provisions within the Amendment protecting
individuals who have had their convictions expunged or set aside and assuring that no
individual will lose their right to a jury trial).
19. See infra Part II.B (discussing state and federal court applications of the
Amendment prior to the Fourth Circuit's decision in Hayes).
20. § 921(a)(33)(A).
21. See § 921(a)(33)(A)(i) (stating the first element in clear and simple terms that
do not require judicial interpretation).
22. See § 921(a)(33)(A)(ii) (defining such individuals to include: "current or
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2. The Domestic Relationship "Element"
One of the contested parts of the Amendment's definition involves the
requisite domestic relationship.23 The majority of the circuits have
determined that a domestic relationship is not required to be a statutorily
specified element of the predicate offense, but the Fourth Circuit
determined that the domestic relationship had to be specified as an element
of the underlying crime.24 However, it is clear from the statute's language
and legislative history that Congress did not intend the statute's meaning to
be the one the Fourth Circuit found.25
C. Rules of Statutory Interpretation
When interpreting a statute, a court must first look to the text and
structure of the statute and determine whether a plain meaning exists.
26
However, when statutory language is ambiguous, courts are to examine the
legislative history, scope, and stated purpose of the statute.27 A statute is
ambiguous if two reasonable persons can differ on the meaning of the
statute.28
Additionally, when a criminal statute is ambiguous, the court must apply
the rule of lenity and resolve the ambiguity in favor of the defendant.29
Courts also retain an interest in interpreting terms in a way that encourages
uniformity in the application of the law.30
former spouse[s], parent[s], or [a] guardian of the victim ... person[s] with whom the
victim shares a child in common . . .person[s] . . .cohabiting with or [who have]
cohabited with the victim as a spouse, parent, or guardian, or ... person[s] similarly
situated to a spouse, parent, or guardian of the victim").
23. See infra Parts III.C, 11I.D (explaining the debate that resulted in differing
opinions between the circuits).
24. See United States v. Hayes, 129 S. Ct. 1079, 1083 (2008) (noting the Fourth
Circuit's deviation from nine other circuits' published opinions).
25. See infra Part III (discussing why the reasoning of the courts that determined a
domestic relationship is not a required element is correct).
26. See, e.g., United States v. Smith, 171 F.3d 617, 620 (8th Cir. 1999) (stating that
the court should look to the legislative history or other sources only when there is
ambiguity in the plain meaning).
27. See Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 108
(1980) (noting that to reject the plain language based on congressional purpose, the
legislative intent must be clearly expressed).
28. See, e.g., United Serv. Auto. Ass'n v. Perry, 102 F.3d 144, 146 (5th Cir. 1996)
(stating that a statute is ambiguous if it is susceptible to more than one meaning).
29. See United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 348 (1971) (citing McBoyle v. United
States, 51 S. Ct. 340 (1931)) (highlighting the importance of fair notice to potential
offenders, for Due Process reasons, as to what the law intends to punish and reflecting
the view that the legislature, and not courts, should determine what conduct warrants
imprisonment).
30. See, e.g., Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 590-92 (1990) (encouraging
courts to find a uniform definition for federal statutes that broadly captures their goals
and encourages equitable application).
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D. Meade and Barnes: Interpretations of the Lautenberg Amendment
Before Hayes
Most federal and state courts have used similar reasoning to hold that the
Lautenberg Amendment does not require that the statute criminalizing the
predicate offense contain a domestic relationship as an element.3I A
predicate offense is the offense that is used as the basis for convicting an
individual for unlawful possession of a firearm under the Amendment.32
The Fourth Circuit, however, recently created a circuit split by using
statutory construction to narrowly interpret the Amendment.33
Multiple federal circuit courts reject the argument that the Amendment
requires the underlying statute of the predicate offense to include a
domestic relationship element when reviewing appeals based on that
argument, partially in light of policy considerations. 34 When interpreting
the language of Amendment, these circuit courts looked at the specific
language of the provision, but also pointed to Senator Lautenberg's intent
regarding domestic violence-related crimes.35
Meade is a well-reasoned, landmark decision in which the First Circuit
held that a domestic relationship is not required as a specified element of
the underlying offense for the purposes of the Amendment.36 In Meade, the
defendant, who had been previously convicted in Massachusetts, argued
that the federal statute making it unlawful for him to possess a firearm did
not apply because the statute underlying his conviction did not contain a
domestic relationship as an enumerated element.37 The defendant argued
31. See generally United States v. Barnes, 295 F.3d 1354 (D.C. Cir. 2002); United
States v. Meade, 175 F.3d 215 (1st Cir. 1999); King v. Wyoming. Div. of Crim.
Investig., 89 P.3d 341, 350 (Wyo. 2004) (holding that the provision does not require
that the predicate offense include a domestic relationship between the perpetrator and
the victim as an element).
32. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1110 (8th ed. 2004) (explaining that predicate
offenses are defined by statute and hence are not uniform state to state).
33. See generally United States v. Hayes, 482 F.3d 749 (4th Cir. 2007), rev'd, 129
S. Ct. 1079 (2009).
34. See, e.g., Barnes, 295 F.3d at 1364 (holding that interpreting the Act to require
a domestic relationship as an element would create a practical anomaly and make the
law a nullity in many states and at the federal level); Meade, 175 F.3d at 220 (stating
that requiring the predicate offense to have a domestic relationship as an element would
make the statute a dead letter law, particularly since Massachusetts did not have a
specific misdemeanor domestic assault offense).
35. See, e.g., Barnes, 295 F.3d at 1365 (pointing to Senator Lautenberg's floor
statements to find that the "as an element" language of the Act was not intended to
apply to the domestic relationship portion of the statute).
36. See Meade, 175 F.3d at 215 (examining statutory language, but relying on both
Senator Lautenberg's statements and policy considerations to justify the court's
interpretation).
37. See id. at 218 (stating that the defendant was convicted under a general assault
and battery statute rather than a specific domestic violence statute).
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that the only crimes fitting the statutory language of the Amendment were
those that had, as a part of their formal definitions, elements of physical
force and a domestic relationship.38
The First Circuit decided that the language was plain and
unambiguous. 39 However, the court acknowledged that the defendant's
interpretation was possible, even though it declined to adopt it.40 The court
noted that although courts should not base the interpretation of a statute on
floor statements, Senator Lautenberg's specifically directed statements
were of particular importance.41
The court in Meade also supported its holding by considering alternative
readings of the statute.42 The court noted that the defendant's interpretation
would make the statute a dead letter law in most jurisdictions because only
a few states' misdemeanor statutes contain relationship status as a formal
element.4 3  The court also declined to utilize Congress' employment of
parallel language in other statutes to support the defendant's position.44
The reasoning of the Meade court is supported by Barnes, another
important case decided three years later.45 In Barnes, the defendant was
convicted under a general assault statute for attacking his son's mother.46
The defendant argued that no law prohibited him from possessing a firearm
because the definition of a MCDV required, as an element, a domestic
relationship, particularly when construing the Act using the rule of last
antecedent.47
38. See id. (rejecting the defendant's argument that the word "element" combines
the mode of aggression and the relationship with the victim into one crime).
39. See id. at 219 (reasoning that since the court found one plain meaning, it did
not need to examine other sources of statutory interpretation).
40. See id (stating that legislative history is often used to remove doubts as to other
suggested meanings).
41. See id. (asserting that the court should pay more attention to floor statements
when the statements are intended to explain how specific provisions should work).
42. See id. at 220 (noting that considering possible alternatives can assist in
determining the persuasiveness of a statute's plain meaning).
43. See id. (arguing that the defendant's interpretation would inhibit the uniform
and consistent application of the statute).
44. See id. at 220-21 (rejecting the parallel language contention because the other
statutes the defendant mentioned are significantly different from the Amendment).
45. See United States v. Barnes, 295 F.3d 1354, 1356-57 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (noting
that the issue is one of first impression for the D.C. Circuit and holding that a domestic
relationship is not a required element of the predicate offense).
46. See id. at 1357 (showing that the convicting court required Barnes to complete
a domestic violence program).
47. See id. at 1360 (explaining that the rule of last antecedent-which states that
qualifying phrases should only modify immediately preceding words or phrases-is
flexible and does not always apply, particularly when using the rule would result in an
unnatural reading). For the purposes of the Amendment, the rule would have the
qualifying phrase "as an element" modify both the "use of force" and the "domestic
relationship," as both phrases immediately follow the qualifier. Cf 18 U.S.C. §
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The D.C. Circuit, looking at the language, stated that the interpretation
48was possible, but did not support the purpose of the Amendment. The
court found a plain meaning in the statute, noting that its opinion was not
alluding to any ambiguity in the language of the Amendment, but the
imprecision of the statute's grammar.49 Additionally, the court emphasized
that the language of the Amendment was clear enough that the court did not
need to rely on legislative history to find a plain meaning. 50 However, the
court still pointed out that very few states have specifically targeted statutes
dealing with domestic violence, as many states rely on generic assault and
battery statutes, and the court referenced Senator Lautenberg's statements
regarding this potential interpretative issue.51
Following the decisions in Meade and Barnes, other circuits followed
suit, using the same general reasoning and explaining that there was no
reason to depart from their sister circuits that had already determined the
issue.52 State court decisions on this question have also aligned with the
majority view in the circuits and similarly reflect a trend of broadly
interpreting controversial parts of the Amendment.
53
E. United States v. Hayes: The Fourth Circuit Creates a Split
Although many federal and state courts decided that the Amendment did
not require a domestic relationship as an element of the predicate offense,
in 2008, the Fourth Circuit held that the federal statute did, in fact, require
922(g)(9) (2006).
48. See Barnes, 295 F.3d at 1363-64 (stating that simply because the word
"element" was singular rather than plural was not determinative of whether the word
applied to both clauses, but that rationale supported the purpose of the Amendment).
49. See id. at 1362 (pointing out that the dissent is incorrect in stating that the
majority opinion alludes to inherent ambiguity in the language and that grammatical
imprecision is not a problem when it does not result in an unnatural reading).
50. See id. at 1365 (stressing that the court will not use legislative history to cloud
clear language, but if the language were unclear, the court could look to the legislative
history).
51. See id. (citing Senator Lautenberg's statement that many convictions for
domestic violence-related crimes are under laws that are "not explicitly identified as
related to domestic violence," so law enforcement officers will not always be able to
determine from the face of an individual's criminal record whether the crime was one
of domestic violence).
52. See, e.g., United States v. Belless, 338 F.3d 1063, 1067 (9th Cir. 2003) (finding
the argument regarding ambiguity and imprecision not compelling enough to cause the
court to disagree with the other circuits).
53. See King v. Wyoming Div. of Crim. Investig., 89 P.3d 341, 349 (Wyo. 2004)
(determining that "the purpose of the law would be thwarted if the only actionable
crimes" were those labeled as domestic violence statutes and "containing the element
of the domestic relationship"); see also State v. Kosina, 595 N.W.2d 464, 467 (Wis. Ct.
App. 1999) (finding, in examining its application, that the crime charged under the
federal statute was not a direct consequence of the guilty plea to the state crime, but a
collateral consequence, meaning the defendant did not have to be previously informed
of the federal statute's effects).
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the predicate offense to list a domestic relationship as an element.5 4 The
Fourth Circuit, much like the courts that had previously examined the issue,
looked at the language of the statute and placed less emphasis on legislative
history, yet reached a holding contrary to the majority of other courts. 55
In Hayes, the defendant was convicted in 1994 under West Virginia's
general battery statute. 6 The defendant committed the battery against his
wife.57 In 2004, police officers responded to a domestic violence call and
found a rifle in the defendant's home after he consented to a search.58 The
trial court convicted the defendant under the Lautenberg Amendment and
the defendant appealed.59
On review, the Fourth Circuit emphasized the particular language of the
federal statute in holding that a domestic relationship must be a statutorily
specified element of the predicate offense.6 ° In looking at the language and
syntax of the Amendment, the Fourth Circuit determined that since the
phrases delineating the use of physical force and the domestic relationship
were not separated by punctuation, Congress had purposefully drafted the
Amendment to require both factors as essential and necessary elements of
the offense.6'
Although the Fourth Circuit stated that the natural reading of the statute
required a domestic relationship as an element of the predicate offense, the
court conceded to an examination of the legislative history.62 The court
acknowledged that Senator Lautenberg and other legislators put forth the
view that the Amendment's purpose was to close a loophole and subject
domestic violence misdemeanants to the same firearm restrictions imposed
54. See United States v. Hayes, 482 F.3d 749, 759 (4th Cir. 2008) (arguing that the
statute requires a domestic relationship and that this requirement is consistent with
legislative intent).
55. Compare Hayes, 482 F.3d at 752 (finding that the text and structure of the
statute clearly require a predicate offense to have, as a formal element, one of the
examples of domestic relationships), with Barnes, 295 F.3d at 1362 (fmding that the
statute plainly requires only one element, the use or attempted use of force).
56. See Hayes, 482 F.3d at 750 (noting that Hayes' sentence was one year of
probation for the misdemeanor battery).
57. See id. (indicating that Hayes lived with his wife and child).
58. See id. (declaring that Hayes was indicted on three counts of unlawful
possession of a firearm).
59. See id at 751 (restating Hayes's challenge that his 1994 conviction was not a
MCDV).
60. See id. at 752 (asserting that a statute is conclusive when it contains an
unambiguous, plain meaning, unless that meaning is at odds with the legislative intent).
61. See id. at 753 (finding that the phrase "has, as an element" applied to both the
clause regarding physical force and the clause regarding a domestic relationship, due to
the lack of a semicolon or other structure separating the two clauses).
62. See id. at 756 (explaining that the court is obliged to apply a statute as written
when there is a clear meaning, unless the literal application of the statute would be
contrary to the drafters' intentions).
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on felons. 63 However, the court determined that Senator Lautenberg only
made one statement addressing the issue of whether a domestic relationship
was a required element of the predicate offense and that the available
legislative history, being so sparse, was not reliable for determining
congressional intent.64 The court decided that a plain reading of the statute
was not at odds with any legislative intent because the court found no
determinative legislative history suggesting that a domestic relationship
was not a necessary element for the predicate offense to qualify as a
MCDV.65 The court held that a domestic relationship was a required
element of the predicate offense in order for the Amendment to apply,
contradicting the other circuits and resulting in a circuit split.
66
F. The Supreme Court Overturns United States v. Hayes
1. The Reasoning
After the Fourth Circuit created a circuit split, the Supreme Court
granted certiorari to determine whether a predicate offense required a
67domestic relationship element for the purposes of the Amendment. The
Court first began by interpreting the specific language of the statute to
determine that a domestic relationship does not need to be a formal element
of the predicate offense.68  The Court also focused on practical
considerations to support its reading of the statute and drew the same
conclusion as the majority of the circuits in holding that a domestic
relationship element is not required.69
The Court addressed the congressional intent to close the loophole and
subject domestic violence misdemeanants to the same firearm restrictions
63. See id. at 757 (noting that the most common domestic violence offenses are
usually misdemeanors under state law).
64. See id. at 758 (holding that the lack of congressional hearings on the statute
rendered the legislative history insufficient to contradict the court's plain language
interpretation of the Amendment).
65. See id. at 759 (averring the court is not at liberty to rewrite the statute to say
what it "think[s]" Congress intended).
66. Compare id at 752 (reversing the lower court decision in finding that the
offense did not fit the definition of a MCDV because it did not specify a domestic
relationship as an element), with United States v. Meade, 175 F.3d 215, 219 (1st Cir.
1999) (finding that a domestic relationship is not a required element of the predicate
offense under the Amendment).
67. See United States v. Hayes, 129 S. Ct. 1079, 1083 (2009) (acknowledging that
the Fourth Circuit was the only circuit to find that a domestic relationship was a
required element).
68. See id. at 1087 n.7 (relaying that the most sensible and natural reading of the
statute is that any conviction for "battering a spouse or other domestic victim" is one of
domestic violence).
69. See id. (noting that the statute would be a dead letter law in many jurisdictions
under the Fourth Circuit's reading).
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as felons.70  The Court acknowledged that the Fourth Circuit's decision
would render the statute meaningless in many states, particularly since
Congress passed the Amendment at a time when only a minority of states
had criminal statutes specifically addressing domestic violence.7'
The Court, going against the Fourth Circuit's opinion and even those of
some other circuits, placed heavy emphasis on the Senator's floor
statements. 2  In using Senator Lautenberg's statements to justify its
reading of the statute, the Court pointed to the lack of additional legislative
history on the matter.73 By finding there was, in fact, legislative history to
support the Court's reading of the statute and no legislative history
opposing its reading, the Court held that a domestic relationship is not
required as an element of the predicate offense when applying the
Amendment.74
2. The Dissenting Opinion of Justice Roberts, Joined by Justice Scalia
The Supreme Court's decision to overturn the Fourth Circuit's holding
was not unanimous.75 Justices Roberts and Scalia dissented on grounds of
statutory interpretation and policy. 76  The Justices' arguments regarding
statutory construction paralleled those of the Fourth Circuit, but the Justices
also introduced different and novel arguments regarding the statute's
legislative history and its practical application.77
First, the dissent argued that the majority improperly relied on the floor
statements because there was no reason to accord the statements such great
70. See id. (stating that the Fourth Circuit's decision would frustrate Congress's
purpose because it would free misdemeanants of domestic violence, convicted under
statutes that did not specify a domestic relationship as an element, from the intended
scope of the Amendment).
71. See id. (explaining that it is unlikely that Congress only intended to include
defendants who had been convicted specifically under domestic violence statutes when
only one-third of states had specific domestic violence statutes).
72. See id. at 1088 (noting Senator Lautenberg's statements that domestic violence
offenders are often convicted under related criminal statutes, such as assault, which do
not have a domestic relationship as part of their express definition).
73. See id. (stating that although floor statements of the chief sponsor are not
controlling, nothing in the legislative history suggests that Congress intended the
statute to apply only to domestic abusers convicted under domestic violence-specific
statutes).
74. See id. at 1089 (reversing the Fourth Circuit and remanding the case).
75. See id. at 1089-90 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (arguing that the majority
incorrectly utilized tools of statutory interpretation and that the domestic relationship is
a requiredelement of the predicate offense for the purposes of the statute).
76. See id at 1089-92 (listing the reasons for dissent: erroneous plain meaning
analysis that relied on an incorrect view of statutory structure, legislative history, and
the rule of lenity, plus, the potential for unfairness in practical application).
77. Id. at 1092.
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significance. 78 The dissent also disagreed with the Court's use of only one
sponsor's statements, stating that the Court ignored the complexities of
legislative action.79
Second, the dissent argued that the Court's decision would cause
problems in the practical application of the statute because law
enforcement agencies would have to undertake an elaborate factfinding
process.80  The dissent, however, did not address any of the alleged
unfairness or specific difficulties that it contended the majority's holding
would create.8
III. ANALYSIS
A. The Fourth Circuit Incorrectly Interpreted the Lautenberg Amendment
when There Was No Compelling Reason to Part with the Reasoning of
Other Circuits
The Fourth Circuit did not have a compelling reason for holding against
its sister circuits in Hayes that a domestic relationship is a required element
of the Lautenberg Amendment. The Fourth Circuit found its own
interpretation of the statute to be clear and unambiguous, which created an
unwarranted circuit split.
82
The definitions section of the Gun Control Act specifically enumerates
only two factors necessary for an underlying offense to be considered a
MCDV. 83 The offense must be a misdemeanor under state or federal law
and must have, "as an element, the use or the attempted use" of physical
force committed against an individual with whom the defendant is in a
domestic relationship.84 The Fourth Circuit, however, created an addition,
interpreting the Amendment to require the element of a specified domestic
78. See id. (contending that floor statements have "inherent flaws" when used "as
guides for legislative intent," particularly when nothing else indicates Congressional
intent).
79. See id. (explaining that legislative enactments are the result of many
compromises).
80. See id. (asserting that it is easier to look at an individual's record of conviction
and examine the predicate's statutory definition than to delve into the underlying facts
to determine if the offense was a crime of domestic violence).
81. See id. (presenting only cases where the Court had examined a predicate
offense to determine the existence of a prior conviction or the element of charged
crime, but presenting no cases where the Court had to analyze the nature of the prior
conduct involved).
82. See United States v. Hayes, 482 F.3d 749, 751 (4th Cir. 2007) (stating that
whether a domestic relationship was a required element of the underlying offense was a
question of pure statutory interpretation).
83. 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(33)(A) (2006).
84. § 921(a)(33)(A)(i)-(ii).
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relationship in the underlying crime.8 5 The court found this interpretation
to be clear and unambiguous from the grammatical structure of the statute
itself.1
6
This argument is weak because the other circuits examined the plain
language and held that the domestic relationship was not an element. 87 A
statute cannot have an unambiguous meaning when circuits facing the issue
interpreted the statute in a directly opposite manner from the so-called
unambiguous meaning. The Fourth Circuit is not correct in arguing that the
plain meaning of the statute requires a domestic relationship as an element.
However, other circuits have acknowledged that, when looking at the plain
and natural meaning of the statute, a Fourth Circuit interpretation is
possible.88 Even so, the Fourth Circuit failed to consider other possible
plain readings of the statute.8 9
The Fourth Circuit, while acknowledging other circuits' holdings,
dismissed their reasoning when examining the statute's plain meaning.
90
Even though other circuits' decisions are merely persuasive and not
binding, those circuits have emphasized the importance of following the
prior holdings, when possible, at the circuit level.9 1 A possible difference
in using the plain meaning canon of statutory interpretation does not justify
creating a circuit split and an inequitable application of the law throughout
the nation.92 Courts have an interest in uniformly defining a term in a
federal statute.93 A vast majority of circuit court decisions found that a
85. See Hayes, 482 F.3d at 753 (stating that the lack of punctuation separating the
domestic relationship clause from the use of force clause makes a domestic relationship
an essential element of the crime). Contra United States v. Meade, 175 F.3d 215, 218
(1st Cir. 1999) (asserting that the fact that the word "element" in the statute was
singular, not plural, supported the court's holding that a domestic relationship was not a
required element).
86. See Hayes, 482 F.3d at 756 (stating that the most natural and plain reading of
the statute requires the offense to have the relationship component as an element).
87. Compare id., with United States v. Griffith, 455 F.3d 1339, 1342 (11th Cir.
2006) (examining neighboring provisions in the Act to resolve any possible ambiguity
in the Amendment), United States v. Barnes, 295 F.3d 1354, 1365-66 (D.C. Cir. 2002)
(holding that the natural reading of the text does not require the domestic relationship
to be an element of the underlying offense), and Meade, 175 F.3d at 218 (finding that
the statute unambiguously does not require a domestic relationship as an element).
88. See United States v. Belless, 338 F.3d 1063, 1067 (9th Cir. 2002) (stating that
Congress could have made a syntactical error in drafting the Amendment).
89. See Hayes, 482 F.3d at 752-53 (focusing only on the grammatical and structural
properties of the statute as opposed to any indecisiveness in meaning).
90. See id. at 754-56 (presenting the analyses of Barnes and Belless as "erroneous"
readings of the statute).
91. See, e.g., Barnes, 295 F.3d at 1362 (noting that other courts' similar
determinations based upon plain reading bolster its own).
92. See Belless, 338 F.3d at 1067 (finding that a possible syntactical error in the
drafting of a statute is not a compelling reason to depart from other circuit opinions).
93. See Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 592 (1990) (stating that certain
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domestic relationship was not a required element of the predicate offense,
and their reliance on each others' holdings implies that this definition of the
Amendment, rather than the Fourth Circuit's definition, is correct.94
In examining this issue, each of the circuits placed heavy emphasis on
the statute's text and grammar.95 Supporters of the Fourth Circuit's holding
argue that because each court had taken such an extensively text-based
approach in interpreting the statute's plain meaning, the courts
unnecessarily relied on extrinsic sources to determine the Amendment's
application. 96 On the contrary, the other circuits did not assert that their
textualist approaches established a single plain meaning, and the courts
sometimes acknowledged that another meaning was possible even when a
single meaning seemed apparent.97 The Fourth Circuit, therefore, was
incorrect in justifying its holding by stating that the plain and most natural
reading of the statute required a domestic relationship as an element of the
predicate offense and by barely using extrinsic sources in its
interpretation.
98
The other circuits acknowledged that the use of the extrinsic sources
supplemented their analyses of the plain meaning of the statute.
99
Therefore, the Fourth Circuit incorrectly interpreted the Amendment and
demonstrated no compelling reason for rejecting other circuit opinions
when it held that a domestic relationship is a required element for a
predicate offense.
terms, such as "burglary," when used in federal statutes, should be uniformly defined to
encourage equitable application of the law).
94. See United States v. Griffith, 455 F.3d 1339, 1346 (1 1th Cir. 2006) (relying
heavily on eight other circuit court opinions and its own precedent in holding that a
domestic relationship does not need to be an element of the prior offense, but that it
must exist in the facts underlying the predicate crime).
95. See, e.g., Barnes, 295 F.3d at 1360 (breaking down the statute's language and
considering specific interpretation rules, such as the rule of last antecedent).
96. See, e.g., Melanie C. Schneider, The Imprecise Draftsmanship of the
Lautenberg Amendment and the Resulting Problems for the Judiciary, 17 COLUM. J.
GENDER & L. 505, 515 (2008) (arguing that since courts took a textualist approach and
refused to declare the Amendment absurd or ambiguous, they should not have relied so
extensively on extrinsic sources, such as Senator Lautenberg's floor statements).
97. See, e.g., Belless, 338 F.3d at 1067 (acknowledging that Congress may have
made a syntactical error, which could make the reading of the statute so as to require a
domestic relationship element at least plausible).
98. See United States v. Hayes, 482 F.3d 749, 756 (4th Cir. 2007) (maintaining that
because the statute has a plain meaning, the court is obligated to apply it unless the
literal application is demonstrably at odds with the legislative intent).
99. See Barnes, 295 F.3d at 1364-65 (stating that the court's interpretation of the
natural meaning is influenced by the practical anomaly that the opposite interpretation
would create and stating that the issue is confirmed by Senator Lautenberg's floor
statements); United States v. Kavoukian, 315 F.3d 139, 144-45 (2d Cir. 2002) (finding
that the legislative history clears up any ambiguity because it supports the court's
interpretation of the plain meaning).
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B. The Supreme Court Correctly Placed Great Importance on Senator
Lautenberg's Specific Floor Statements
The Supreme Court correctly emphasized the importance of Senator
Lautenberg's statements in interpreting the Amendment, especially
considering the dearth of other legislative history concerning its
enactment. 00 The majority of circuits acknowledged the ambiguity that
potentially existed in the Amendment's format, so the courts correctly
examined the legislative history to determine the proper interpretation.'10
In interpreting the statutory definition of a MCDV, the courts looked to the
Amendment's legislative history, which consisted mainly of Senator
Lautenberg's floor statements. 0 2 Additionally, even when the statute's
plain language reveals a seemingly unambiguous meaning that is not
absurd, a court may still use other sources to confirm its take on the proper
meaning. 1
03
Asserting that the plain meaning it discovered did not contradict
legislative intent, the Fourth Circuit was able to impose the domestic
relationship element because it characterized the legislative history as
unreliable. 10 4 The court found that the legislative history was insufficient
to indicate any clear legislative intent that would require the court to
disregard the supposedly unambiguous plain meaning established by the
Fourth Circuit. 0 5 The Amendment had been included in a larger bill on an
unrelated topic. 1 6 Yet in actuality, because ambiguity possibly exists in
the statute's plain language, the legislative history is particularly important
in establishing the meaning the drafters intended to give to the statute. This
is especially true in light of the Supreme Court's observation that although
100. Adam Piore, Republicans Give up Fight on Gun Ban; Lautenberg Bill Targets
Batterers, THE RECORD, Sept. 29, 1996, at A17 (discussing how Senator Lautenberg
fought Republicans' attempts to strip-down the bill and effectively close the existing
loophole in the Gun Control Act).
101. See Belless, 338 F.3d at 1067 (suggesting that the statute's language could have
different meanings and that each meaning should therefore be compared to
congressional intent).
102. See, e.g., Kavoukian, 315 F.3d at 144-45 (attributing the plain meaning that
best expresses Congress' intention to be the one supported by the legislative history of
the Amendment).
103. See United States v. Meade, 175 F.3d 215, 219 (1st Cir. 1999) (justifying the
use of secondary sources to remove lingering doubts, even when the court has already
found a plain meaning).
104. See United States v. Hayes, 482 F.3d 749, 756-59 (4th Cir. 2007) (stating that a
court cannot rewrite the definition of a MCDV based solely on what it supposes
Congress meant).
105. See id. at 758 (pointing to the lack of congressional hearings on the statute and
the idea that the Amendment was passed as a part of a last minute series of
congressional maneuvers).
106. See Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 104-208,
110 Stat. 3001 (1996) (showing that the main focus of the bill was fiscal).
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the legislative history was minimal and that the remarks of a single senator
are not usually controlling, the legislative record on the Amendment was
otherwise silent.1
0 7
Although the legislative record regarding the Amendment is indeed
minimal, evidence suggests that Congress did not intend to require a
domestic relationship as an element of the predicate offense and no
evidence exists that argues otherwise.'0 8 The main legislative history that
exists on the record is the chief sponsor's floor statements, which are
directed specifically toward the provision in question. 0 9 The majority of
circuits and the Supreme Court properly used these specific statements to
influence their interpretation of the Amendment." 0  In fact, Senator
Lautenberg's statements imply that law enforcement agents and
prosecutors should not hesitate to inquire into the underlying facts of a
violent misdemeanor conviction to ascertain whether it involved domestic
violence if this is not apparent from the formal elements of the offense.' 1
It is important that Senator Lautenberg's statements were specifically
directed toward this particular provision and that the Senator had the
foresight to predict that the statute, as drafted, might cause uncertainty,
despite the fact that the comments came from only a single sponsor. 1
2
When analyzing legislative history, courts have held that explanations that
are directed towards the implementation of specific provisions are more
107. See United States v. Hayes, 129 S. Ct. 1079, 1088 (2009) (discerning that
nothing in the minimal legislative history suggests that Congress intended to confine
the Amendment to abusers who violated statutes formally containing a domestic
relationship element and that the available legislative evidence suggests the opposite).
108. See id. at 1087 (noting that such a limitation would frustrate Congress' purpose
of closing the dangerous loophole).
109. See 142 CONG. REC. S11878 (daily ed. Sept. 30, 1996) (statement of Sen.
Lautenberg) (stating that many convictions for domestic violence-related crimes are
under criminal statutes that are not explicitly domestic violence-related and
encouraging law enforcement agencies to thoroughly investigate misdemeanor
convictions in an individual's record to ensure an absence of a history of domestic
violence).
110. See Hayes, 129 S. Ct. at 1087 (applying Senator Lautenberg's statement that he
intended to close the gap between the many people who engage in serious spousal or
child abuse who are not convicted of felonies and the then-existing possession laws
which barred only felons); United States v. Barnes, 295 F.3d 1354, 1365 (D.C. Cir.
2002) (relying on Senator Lautenberg's specific statement that it would not always be
possible for law enforcement to know from the face of an individual's criminal record
whether the particular misdemeanor conviction involved domestic violence).
111. Cf United States v. Siegel, 477 F.3d 87, 92-93 (3d Cir. 2007) (citing United
States v. Shepherd, 544 U.S. 13, 16-17 (2005)) (holding, in the context of the
Amendment's use of force provision, that a presentence report is perfectly acceptable
evidence to admit when a court is forced to look beyond the formal elements of the
predicate act and into the underlying facts of the defendant's conduct).
112. See United States v. Meade, 175 F.3d 215, 219 (1st Cir. 1999) (explaining that
although limitations exist on the extent to which courts may rely on an individual
legislator's statements in interpreting a statute, contemporaneous statements by a
sponsor are entitled to consideration even if they are not conclusive).
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instructive than general statements regarding legislation." 3  Senator
Lautenberg's statements clearly show an intention to include convictions
for offenses that do not contain a domestic relationship as an element; he
specifically pointed out that many domestic violence-related convictions
are not obtained under statutes that mention domestic violence and that law
enforcement agencies should make reasonable efforts to ensure whether an
offense involved domestic violence." 14
Furthermore, the fact that the senator's floor statements align with the
plain language meaning that the majority of courts established supports the
interpretation that a domestic relationship is not required as an element of
the underlying offense.' 15 When more than one plausible, plain meaning
exists, it is helpful to examine legislative history to determine the
congressional intent behind the word or phrase." 6  In interpreting the
Amendment, the legislative intent is clear from the legislative record. Few
states have actual domestic assault statutes; rather, individuals convicted of
domestic violence-related crimes are convicted under general assault or
similar offense statutes.' 1 7 Therefore, requiring a domestic relationship as
an element of the predicate offense would render the Amendment a nullity
in most states.''
8
Critics of this 'dead letter' argument counter that Congress intended for
the Amendment to encourage more states to enact specific and separate
domestic assault statutes for convicting domestic violence offenders. 119
113. See id. (noting that "specificity breeds credibility" because there is a reason that
floor statements would be directed to specific provisions).
114. See 142 CONG. REc. S 11878 (daily ed. Sept. 30, 1996) (statement of Sen.
Lautenberg) (stating that the existence of domestic violence will not always be clear on
the face of the record); see also United States v. Kavoukian, 315 F.3d 139, 145-46 (2nd
Cir. 2002) (reasoning that many statutes used to combat domestic violence lack specific
language, such that requiring a domestic relationship as an element would render the
Amendment nearly meaningless, even under federal domestic abuse law).
115. See Meade, 175 F.3d at 219 (citing Brock v. Pierce County, 476 U.S. 253, 263
(1986)) (noting that floor statements can be evidence of legislative intent when
consistent with the plain meaning of statutory language).
116. See United States v. Belless, 338 F.3d 1063, 1067 (9th Cir. 2003) (appreciating
that the legislative process may have subordinated clear writing to some other goal and
that the construction that attributes a rational purpose to Congress is the proper
interpretation).
117. See United States v. Barnes, 295 F.3d 1354, 1364 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (remarking
that fewer than half the states have domestic assault statutes that include, as formal
elements, both the use of force and a specified relationship between the offender and
the victim); see also United States v. Smith, 171 F.3d 617, 623 (8th Cir. 1999)
(averring that when a state has a separate domestic assault statute and an individual is
convicted of a domestic violence-related crime under the general assault statute, the
Amendment is still applicable to the general assault conviction).
118. See United States v. Hayes, 129 S. Ct. 1079, 1087 (2009) (stating that at the
time of the Amendment's enactment, only about one-third of the states had statutes
which specifically mentioned a domestic relationship as an element).
119. See Schneider, supra note 96, at 546 (arguing that Congress may have intended
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After all, the legislative history presents a clear intention to close the
dangerous loophole that existed by allowing those convicted of
misdemeanor crimes of domestic violence to possess firearms. 120 However,
as previously noted, no evidence in the statutory language or the legislative
record demonstrates an intent to incentivize legislative changes at the state
level, and when the court settles on one natural meaning, the court selects
the construction that parallels the evidenced legislative intent, not a hidden
or unstated intention.1
21
Finally, the Fourth Circuit, without explicitly relying on the rule of
lenity, attempts to use the rule to bolster its holding by asserting that the
rule of lenity would lead it to the same outcome.122 The court, however,
inappropriately invokes the rule of lenity in Hayes because its use is
inconsistent with express congressional intent and the statutory language is
not hopelessly ambiguous. 123 The Supreme Court, on the other hand, did
not discuss the rule of lenity in its analysis of Hayes.124 Therefore, if the
Fourth Circuit truly believed it found the most natural meaning through
statutory construction, it cannot use the rule of lenity in bolstering its
holding, because according to the Fourth Circuit, the statute was not
ambiguous enough to even look to legislative history for clarification.
Further, even if it had noted ambiguity in the plain language, it cannot use
the rule of lenity when it has refused to place the necessary importance on
the legislative history prior to applying the rule.
C. The Dissent Reached a Misguided Conclusion in Finding that the
Sponsor's Statements Were Irrelevant
The dissent in Hayes incorrectly posited that Senator Lautenberg's floor
statements were insufficient for the purpose of interpreting the
Amendment. Chief Justice Roberts' dissent argues that the majority
to create a long-term solution by incentivizing state legislatures to specifically
criminalize domestic violence).
120. See Hayes, 129 S. Ct. at 1087-88 (maintaining that firearms and domestic strife
are a potentially deadly combination).
121. See Belless, 338 F.3d at 1067 (declaring that the court must choose the
construction that attributes a rational purpose to Congress).
122. See United States v. Hayes, 482 F.3d 749, 759 (4th Cir. 2007) (stating that the
rule of lenity, which says that ambiguities in a criminal statute must be resolved in
favor of the defendant, requires the court to hold that a domestic relationship must be
an element of the predicate offense).
123. See United States v. Kavoukian, 315 F.3d 139, 144 (2d Cir. 2002) (holding that
the rule of lenity is inapposite when congressional intent is evident).
124. See Hayes, 129 S. Ct. at 1089 (pronouncing that the rule of lenity does not
apply because the language of the statute is not grievously ambiguous); see also
Kavoukian, 315 F.3d at 144 (refusing to apply the rule of lenity because no reasonable
doubt persisted about the statute's intended scope after resorting to its language and
structure, legislative history, and motivating policies).
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incorrectly relied on Senator Lautenberg's floor statements when
interpreting the Amendment. 125  Although in certain cases, a single
sponsor's statements should not serve as a basis for statutory interpretation,
the Supreme Court majority correctly utilized Senator Lautenberg's
statements in Hayes.
The dissent correctly argues that, ordinarily, divining the broad purpose
of legislation according to a single sponsor's objective can ignore the
complexities of the legislative process. 126 Admittedly, legislative action is
often the result of a compromise between competing interests. 2  Courts
generally look for a clear direction when using congressional intent as a
means of interpretation. 28 This sensible means of statutory interpretation
encounters practical difficulty most often in cases where the sponsor's
intent appears to disregard the plain language of the statute. 129 Other cases
demonstrate various situations in which the Court will not place any weight
on a sponsor's statements. For example, the Court ignored a congressional
statement when the person speaking was not the sponsor of the legislation
at issue, but instead, the author of a similar bill containing different, less
restrictive provisions. 30  The Court also ignored a sponsor's floor
statements when they did not specifically apply to the provision in
question.' 3' In that case, the statements were not clear enough to provide
legitimate support for the proposed interpretation. 1
32
In Hayes, Senator Lautenberg's floor statements are not contrary to the
plain meaning of the statute; rather, Senator Lautenberg's objective
125. See Hayes, 129 S. Ct. at 1092 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (arguing that relying
on a single legislator's objective does not reflect the true nature of legislative action,
which is the product of compromise reached by competing interests).
126. See id. (expressing that the majority inappropriately took the sponsor's
objective to represent the entirety of Congress' manifest purpose).
127. See Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. v. Dimension Fin. Corp., 474
U.S. 361, 373-74 (1986) (arguing that although "Congress may be unanimous" in
intending to eradicate "social or economic evil," individual members may have very
different views on a solution).
128. See, e.g., United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 339 (1971) (refusing to adopt a
broader meaning of the statute in the absence of clearer direction from Congress).
129. See Dimension Fin. Corp., 474 U.S. at 374 (noting that the invocation of the
legislature's "plain purpose" at the expense of the statute's terms ignores the
compromise process and prevents the effectuation of true congressional intent).
130. See Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 118-
19 (1980) (explaining that the statement of a non-sponsor of the ultimately-enacted bill
is an unreliable indicator of congressional intent).
131. See Bass, 404 U.S. at 345 (finding that the government could not use a
congressional statement to argue for removal of a jurisdictional nexus when the law
explicitly contained a commerce clause provision and the sponsoring senator never
spoke on the provision).
132. See id. at 346 (recognizing that the sponsor's statements were ambiguous
regarding the issue in question and only created a "mutually destructive dialectic"
rather than assisting in statutory interpretation).
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parallels the plain meaning found by the Supreme Court and the majority of
the circuit courts.' 33 The majority did not use the floor statements as the
only basis for its holding, but simply used the statements to buttress the
majority's plain reading. 34 The Court did not ignore the statute's plain
meaning and specific terms when it examined the purpose of the
legislation; the Court first analyzed the statute's text and structure to find a
plain meaning and subsequently supported its conclusion by demonstrating
congressional intent through legislative history. 135
Ordinarily a single legislator's statements are not controlling.1 36
However, only minimal legislative history exists on the record for this
Amendment. 137  Senator Lautenberg, however, was not only a general
sponsor of the Amendment, but a main sponsor of the specific provision in
question. 138 Furthermore, Senator Lautenberg's floor statements should be
considered the definitive congressional discussion on the issue because
there were no other statements made regarding the Amendment and there
were no rebuttals to Senator Lautenberg's comments. 139
The Court has held that a sponsor's statements are irrelevant when they
133. See United States v. Hayes, 129 S. Ct. 1079, 1088-89 (2009) (citing Senator
Lautenberg's floor statements and observing that a domestic relationship would often
not be a designated element of the predicate offense, which supports the Court's chosen
plain meaning); see also United States v. Barnes, 295 F.3d 1354, 1365 (D.C. Cir. 2002)(agreeing with Senator Lautenberg's statement that law enforcement authorities would
not always know "from the face of a criminal record whether a conviction" involved
domestic violence and using this statement in support of the court's natural reading of
the statute).
134. See Hayes, 129 S. Ct. at 1087-89 (referring to Senator Lautenberg's floor
statements to inform its holding in terms of practical considerations and the broadly
remedial purposes of the Amendment).
135. Compare id. at 1084-87 (utilizing various textualist approaches in interpreting
the Amendment before referring to external sources), with Bd. of Governors of the Fed.
Reserve Sys. v. Dimension Fin. Corp., 474 U.S. 361, 373 (1986) (critiquing the
Board's "reasonable interpretation" of statutory language: the meaning the Board gave
to the term was at odds with its ordinary usage and the Board disingenuously cited the
"policy of the [Bank Holding Company Act] as a whole" while ignoring the plain
language of the specific provision).
136. See Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 118(1980) (establishing that the statements of a single sponsor who only generally
sponsored the bill and did not draft its language carried no weight).
137. See Hayes, 129 S. Ct. at 1088 (announcing that even though a sponsor's
statements are only persuasive, no evidence on the legislative record supports a
contrary interpretation).
138. Compare 142 CONG. REC. S 11876 (daily ed. Sept. 30, 1996) (statement of Sen.
Lautenberg) (identifying himself as the author of the provision which prohibited
anyone convicted of a MCDV from possessing firearms), with Consumer Prod Safety
Comm'n, 447 U.S. at 118 (holding that the senator's statements were irrelevant because
he was merely a general sponsor).
139. Cf James v. United States, 550 U.S. 192, 201 (2007) (holding that the Court
could not use proffered legislative history of the original bill because it was not
Congress' last word on the issue and the language in question had been added
subsequently to expand the scope of the bill).
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are unclear and do not specifically apply to the issue at hand. 140 However,
Senator Lautenberg made his floor statements for the purpose of clarifying
the meaning of the provision in the Amendment defining a MCDV.
14 1
Additionally, a senator's floor statements that are directed to specific
provisions carry more weight than general floor statements regarding a
statute as a whole.1
42
Courts have a history of referring to sponsor's floor statements
specifically when considering the Gun Control Act. 143 In Taylor v. United
States, the Supreme Court closely examined the legislative history of the
Act to determine what constituted a violent felony and whether the
definition included a non-violent burglary. 44  The Court specifically
utilized a senator's floor statements in holding that the statute's language
would not categorically exclude a burglary from being a violent felony.
45
Since Senator Lautenberg's floor statements were: directed towards the
specific provision; made by the sponsor who authored the enacted
provision; not at odds with the statute's plain meaning; and not the sole
basis for the Court's interpretation of the Amendment, the dissent
incorrectly refused to find significance in Senator Lautenberg's floor
statements.
D. The Dissent's Practical Considerations and Implications Are Not
Problematic when the Majority Interpretation Mirrors Congressional
Intent
The Hayes dissenters' second argument for rejecting the majority
140. See United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 345-46 (1971) (dismissing the
sponsor's statement because it did not relate directly to or clarify the issue); see also
Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n, 447 U.S. at 119-20 (finding that congressional
statements are not authoritative when the statements were not intended to address the
issue in question but another issue completely).
141. Compare 142 CONG. REC. S11876 (statement of Sen. Lautenberg) (specifying
that the face of a criminal record may not always show that a conviction involved
domestic violence, for example, when the defendant pleaded down to lesser offense),
with Bass, 404 U.S. at 345 (opining that the senator's floor statements were too general
and not targeted at the relevant provision so as to be a reliable interpretive guide).
142. See United States v. Meade, 175 F.3d 215, 219 (1st Cir. 1999) (insisting that a
court should pay more attention to statements explaining specific provisions because
their "specificity lends credibility").
143. See Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 590 n.5 (1990) (highlighting a
senator's floor statements to interpret another definition in the Gun Control Act); see
also United States v. Nason, 269 F.3d 10, 16-17 (1st Cir. 2001) (using, to support a
circuit court's plain reading of the use of force element, Senator Lautenberg's targeted
statement that acts like "cutting up a credit card with scissors" were not crimes of
violence for the purposes of the Amendment).
144. 495 U.S. at 581-90.
145. See id at 581 (noting that the sponsor's floor statements acknowledged that
although burglary is generally non-violent, the character of a burglary can change
rapidly).
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holding is that the Court's interpretation would create unfairness and
problems in practical application. 146 The dissent argues that due to judicial
precedent, the Court must embrace the categorical approach, where courts
look only to statutory elements of a predicate offense in interpreting the
statute. 147
Generally, the Court prefers a categorical approach when examining
predicate offenses.148  Undoubtedly, under certain circumstances, the
categorical approach is appropriate because a factual approach can cause
practical difficulties. 149  The Court has properly refused to require an
elaborate factfinding process when nothing in the legislative history
supports such a requirement. 150
Although this is the general approach, the Court has stated that certain
situations will require a factual approach: Hayes constitutes one of these
situations.1 5 1 First, the minimal legislative history here demonstrates a
clear congressional intent to require the so-called elaborate factfinding
process. 152 Second, this is not a situation where the factfinding process
would necessarily be overly burdensome. 153 For the purposes of
146. See United States v. Hayes, 129 S. Ct. 1079, 1092-93 (2009) (Roberts, C.J.,
dissenting) (arguing that the Court is incorrect in not taking the "categorical approach"
to predicate offenses, which requires the judge or jury to examine the statutory
elements of the predicate offense in the abstract, rather than inquire into the underlying
facts of a defendant's conviction).
147. See id (stating that the factual approach can create difficulties, increase
potential unfairness, and require elaborate factfinding processes).
148. See Taylor, 495 U.S. at 602 (finding that although courts should take a
categorical approach to predicate offenses, there is a narrow range of situations where
courts may look to the underlying facts); see also Nason, 269 F.3d at 14 ("[T]his case
differs from Taylor in that it deals with the examination of a predicate offense that
constitutes a formal element of the charged crime, whereas Taylor deals with the
examination of predicate offenses to determine the applicability of provisions
mandating enhanced sentences.").
149. See Taylor, 495 U.S. at 601-02 (providing examples of the difficulties a factual
approach may create, such as when a trial court and a sentencing court make different
factual conclusions).
150. See id at 601 (claiming that if Congress meant to adopt an approach that would
require the sentencing court to engage in an elaborate factfinding process, it would
have been mentioned in the legislative history); see also Shepard v. United States, 544
U.S. 13, 15 (2005) (noting that the rule of reading statutes embraces the categorical
approach and limits the scope of judicial factfinding to avoid serious risks of
unconstitutionality).
151. See Taylor, 495 U.S. at 602 (noting that there is a narrow range of cases that
require courts to look beyond the mere conviction, particularly when juries have
considered facts in determining the conviction).
152. Compare 142 CONG. REC. S11878 (daily ed. Sept. 30, 1996) (statement of Sen.
Lautenberg) (urging law enforcement authorities to thoroughly investigate
misdemeanor convictions to ensure that none involve domestic violence), with Taylor,
495 U.S. at 601 (finding nothing in the legislative history to indicate that Congress
intended to require courts to engage in a factfinding process rather than consider only
the statutory elements of a predicate offense).
153. See United States v. Hayes, 129 S. Ct 1079, 1088 n.8 (2009) (pointing out that
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determining if the predicate crime was one of domestic violence, the
answer may be as simple as examining the record of the offense or a
charging document to find the victim's last name or residency, which could
indicate a spousal or familial relationship.
E. A Domestic Relationship Is Not a Required Element of the Predicate
Offense Because Application of the Federal Law Would Improperly
Depend on State Law
A court should not interpret a federal statute in a manner which causes
the statute to rely completely on state law.1 54 The majority in Hayes points
out that it is impractical and implausible to require a domestic relationship
as an element of the predicate offense for the purposes of the
Amendment. 155 It is true that, at times, Congress passes unwise and poorly
written legislation, and the courts, rather than attempting to fix the
legislation according to congressional intent, should uphold the statute
according to the meaning the courts determine from the plain language.
56
Although courts should not attempt to cure drafting issues in federal
legislation, they should not read federal statutes in a manner that makes the
application of the federal law dependent on state law.'
57
The dissent argues for a categorical approach that examines only the
statutory elements of the predicate offense, but this appears to ignore the
maxim that application of a federal law should not depend on state law.'
58
The dissent appears to suggest that when pursuing convictions under the
Amendment, law enforcement agents, prosecutors, and courts should rely
generally, an elaborate factfinding process would not be necessary to determine
whether a domestic relationship existed between the perpetrator and the victim).
154. See, e.g., United States v. Weyhrauch, 548 F.3d 1237, 1246 (9th Cir. 2008)
("Congress has a legitimate interest in ensuring that.., the happenstance of whether
state law prohibits particular conduct should not control Congress' ability to protect
federal interests through the federal... statutes.").
155. See Hayes, 129 S. Ct. at 1087 (stating that the Fourth Circuit's interpretation
would have made the Amendment dead letter law upon enactment in approximately
two-thirds of the states).
156. See Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. v. Dimension Fin. Corp., 474
U.S. 361, 374 (1986) (acknowledging that sometimes, applying a statute the way
Congress has written it might create anomalies, but that the Court should simply
uphold it because problems in the statute's drafting are for Congress, and not the
courts, to fix); see also United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 344 (1971) (stating that
guiding principles of statutory interpretation are not substitutes for congressional
lawmaking).
157. See Taylor, 495 U.S. at 591-92 (illuminating that federal laws should be
construed so they do not depend on state law because the application of federal law is
nationwide and the federal program would be impaired if state law controlled its
application).
158. See Hayes, 129 S. Ct. at 1092 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (noting that the Court
has previously utilized a categorical approach in various situations, including the
interpretation of the term "burglary" in the Gun Control Act).
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on definitions and labels established by the states.
159
By relying only on the face of the criminal records and not looking
further to see whether a domestic relationship existed between the
perpetrator and the victim, courts will likely apply the Amendment in a
disparate manner since jurisdictions have different laws for convicting
perpetrators of domestic violence.160  When applying the Amendment, a
factual approach is appropriate because it more effectively supports a
definition of misdemeanor crimes of domestic violence that would result in
the uniform application of the firearms prohibition across the nation,
regardless of the statute under which the individual was convicted. 16 1
Although generally, the categorical approach has precedent on its side and
may be simpler to apply in some circumstances, courts should not choose it
where it would weaken the impact of a federal law by allowing state law to
heavily dictate the federal law's application.
IV. POLICY IMPLICATIONS
The Fourth Circuit's reasoning provides individuals who are guilty of
domestic violence with the opportunity to introduce a firearm into an
already dangerous situation. 162 According to the court, only individuals
convicted under specific, state domestic violence statutes containing the
requisite relationship "element" cannot possess firearms. 163 Such reasoning
has two negative policy implications. First, individuals convicted of
assault and battery for acts against a partner in a domestic relationship can
possess firearms, freeing them from the restrictions specifically intended
for them.' 64 Second, in states without specific domestic violence statutes,
159. But see Taylor, 495 U.S. at 592 (insisting that the term in question should have
some uniform definition independent of the labels used by various states' criminal
codes).
160. See Hayes, 129 S. Ct. at 1087 (observing that at the time Congress enacted the
Amendment, only about one-third of states had criminal statutes specifically
proscribing domestic violence, and even as recently as 2009, approximately half of the
states still prosecute domestic violence exclusively under general criminal statutes).
161. See, e.g., Taylor, 495 U.S. at 592 (noting that the federal law there would be
applied unevenly depending on state law, even when states were prohibiting identical
criminal conduct, as a result of the varying labels state laws place on offenses).
162. See United States v. Hayes, 482 F.3d 749, 750 (4th Cir. 2008) (permitting the
defendant, who abused his spouse, to lawfully possess a firearm because he was
convicted of battery, not domestic violence).
163. See id at 759 (holding that a predicate offense, to qualify as a MCDV, must
contain the domestic relationship element).
164. See, e.g., id. (allowing a defendant to possess firearms even though he
committed a battery against his wife); see also 142 CONG. REC. S 11876 (daily ed. Sept.
30, 1996) (statement of Sen. Lautenberg) (imagining a situation where an individual
commits a crime of domestic violence, is convicted of a misdemeanor, and later brings
a firearm into his abusive relationship, creating a life or death situation).
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the Lautenberg Amendment becomes meaningless altogether. 65
Contrastingly, other circuit courts and the Supreme Court addressed the
Amendment's potential ambiguity and looked to the Amendment's
legislative history to effectuate the law's purpose: to prevent deadly
incidents of domestic violence.166 The Supreme Court's holding in Hayes
ensures that courts will apply the Lautenberg Amendment appropriately to
properly punish domestic violence perpetrators. 1
67
V. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court correctly held that a domestic relationship is not a
required element of the predicate offense for the purposes of the
Lautenberg Amendment. The discrepancies evident in several courts'
interpretations of this statute encourage placing more importance on
legislative history, since each court found a plain meaning, but not
necessarily the same plain meaning. 68  This clearly demonstrates that
although a plain, unambiguous meaning may appear obvious to one reader,
another may interpret the language in a contrary manner.
To resolve this, courts should look to legislative history when there is
evidence of ambiguity in other judicial opinions, even if the court, like the
Fourth Circuit in Hayes, does not feel the statute is glaringly ambiguous,
and even if the prior decisions are not binding. The Fourth Circuit ignored
the reasonable plain readings of its sister circuits and managed to avoid
looking at legislative history by summarily concluding that the
Amendment's language was not ambiguous. Ignoring non-binding, yet
well-reasoned decisions when examining a statute's plain meaning
165. See NAT'L CTR. ON FULL FAITH AND CREDIT, STATE STATUTES: MISDEMEANOR
CRIMES OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, (2008), http://www.abanet.org/domviol/docs/State-
MCDV-Matrix.pdf (demonstrating that many states do not have domestic violence
statutes, including populous states such as Texas, Florida, New York, and
Massachusetts).
166. See, e.g., United States v. Belless, 338 F.3d 1063, 1067 (9th Cir. 2003) (stating
that since the statute is susceptible to at least two interpretations, the court must look to
congressional purpose to determine which meaning applies).
167. See United States v. Hayes, 129 S. Ct. 1079, 1087 (2009) (highlighting the
Amendment's purpose of keeping firearms out of abusive domestic relationships
because firearms and domestic strife are a deadly combination); see also Dep't of
Defense, Directive 6400.06, at 10-11 (Aug. 21, 2007), available at http://www.dtic.mil
/whs/directives/corres/pdf/640006p.pdf (highlighting that military personnel have an
ongoing, affirmative obligation to inform their superiors if they have or receive a
"qualifying conviction" for domestic violence, causing the person to relinquish his or
her military issued firearm and to dispose of privately-owned guns).
168. Compare Hayes, 482 F.3d at 752 (finding that the plain meaning of the statute
requires a domestic relationship as a designated element of the predicate offense), with
Hayes, 129 S. Ct. at 1087 (finding the statute's plain meaning is that a domestic
relationship must be established but need not be a denominated element of the
predicate offense), and Belless, 338 F.3d at 1066-67 (acknowledging that either reading
of the statute is possible).
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constitutes a brand of judicial activism that can have serious implications
for the equitable application of federal law.
Examining legislative history when potential ambiguity exists will assist
courts in furthering Congress' purpose. Although courts are not to do
Congress' job, at times, particularly in situations such as the one involving
the Lautenberg Amendment, a court should be able to discover Congress'
purpose-despite grammatically weak legislation-and apply it. Finally,
legislative history is particularly important when dealing with legislation
related to state law, especially when the state law may weaken the intended
effect of the federal law. Congressional intent should not be sacrificed
simply because a court unilaterally shuts its eyes to potential ambiguities.
